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Minimum Wages and Welfare in a Hotelling Duopsony 
 
Two firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0,1] prior to 
announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed; the 
(constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of 
the two-stage location-wage game are studied under laissez-faire and under a minimum 
wage regime. Up to a restriction for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, the imposition of 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing literature on the theory of oligopsony, and the insights it can offer 
into the operation of labour markets (Bhaskar and To (1999, 2003), Kaas and Madden 
(2008), Manning (2003)). Analysis of the impact of minimum wage legislation is a 
major theme in this literature, and it is the focus of our paper. 
It is well-known that the monopsony market structure (unlike perfect competition) can 
produce increases in aggregate employment and social welfare after a minimum wage 
imposition, a result that provides explanation of some empirical claims, albeit via the 
perhaps extreme monopsony assumption (see Manning (2003)). Bhaskar and To 
(1999) extend the argument to a wage-setting oligopsony, with exogenous, horizontal 
differentiation of firms’ non-wage job characteristics (symmetric locations around a 
Salop circular city populated by a uniform distribution of workers) and firms of equal 
efficiency. They show that social welfare improvements from the imposition of 
minimum wages again emanate from the aggregate employment channel (see also 
Walsh (2003)). Secondly, in a similar differentiated oligopsony but now with firms of 
heterogeneous efficiency, Bhaskar and To (2003) provide explanations of certain 
empirical features of wage distributions and the impact of minimum wages. There is 
no welfare analysis in this model, and neither paper addresses the consequences of 
asymmetry between firms’ non-wage job characteristics, or choice of these 
characteristics. We allow asymmetry in firms’ efficiency, asymmetric non-wage job 
characteristics and firm choice of these characteristics. We demonstrate a new channel  
through which imposition of minimum wages is welfare improving
1, namely their 
impact on horizontally differentiated, non-wage job characteristics
2.  
                                                 
1 Kaas and Madden (2008) provide yet another; minimum wages can improve social welfare (in a 
symmetric location Salop oligopsony) because they improve firms’ investment, and reduce the “hold-
up” problem.   3
To facilitate our analysis of job characteristics we switch to a Hotelling linear city 
duopsony model, analogous to the familiar Hotelling duopoly model (d’Apremont et 
al. (1979), Ziss (1993)). Workers are uniformly distributed along the line, and the 
non-wage job characteristic of each firm is a point on the line. One interpretation is 
that the line represents geographical location, so that the distance between a worker 
and a firm is the worker’s commuting distance, and we usually adopt this 
interpretation since there is empirical evidence that commuting time is a significant 
non-wage job characteristic for workers (see Delfgaauw (2007))
3. On the other hand, 
there are other interpretations where horizontal differentiation arises because multiple 
vertical characteristics are inherently linked. For example, longer opening hours (of a 
retail shop, say) entails more worker flexibility but, simultaneously, less convenient 
working hours.  
We present a 2-stage game model where two firms choose locations at stage I and 
wages at stage II, and we study the impact of minimum wages on the laissez-faire 
equilibrium and welfare. We assume full employment throughout, so as to abstract 
completely from the known aggregate effect, and we find a new route whereby 
minimum wages can be a good thing; under laissez-faire jobs are too differentiated (as 
in d’Apremont et al. (1979), Ziss (1993)), but (up to a pure strategy existence limit) 
minimum wages always improve (aggregate) social welfare because they reduce the 
job differentiation. All individual workers benefit from increased minimum wages, 
but firm profits decline. Intuitively, with a binding minimum wage the firms’ desire to 
soften wage competition by moving apart is limited; firms move closer to the centre to 
                                                                                                                                            
2 In an asymmetric information labour market model without our oligopsony features, de Fraja(1999) 
studies the effect of minimum wages on a vertically differentiated job characteristic (e.g. working 
conditions) and finds that minimum wage increases can make low-paid workers worse off because of a 
deterioration in working conditions.  
3 Using Dutch data, Delfgaauw (2007, p. 308) finds that from a mix of 15 horizontally and vertically 
differentiated  job characteristics, “the main instigators of job search are dissatisfaction with (future) 
job duties, followed by dissatisfaction with the atmosphere at work, commuting time, and autonomy”.   4
increase market share. By allowing for heterogeneity in firm efficiency, in 
equilibrium, the minimum wage binds either on the less efficient firm only, or on both 
firms. We demonstrate that the market share of the efficient firm is socially too low 
under laissez faire but that it increases when the minimum wage starts binding on its 
less efficient rival. Finally, we wish to emphasize that analogous policy conclusions 
can be obtained for price ceilings in the standard Hotelling duopoly model which is 
formally equivalent to the duopsony model of this paper.      
Section 2 sets out our general framework, section 3 analyses the effect of minimum 
wages on the subgame perfect equilibria of the 2-stage game, and normative, welfare 
issues are addressed in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. THE  FRAMEWORK 
There are 2 firms (i =0,1) producing output from labour at constant marginal revenue 
product of  i φ  where  1 0 φ φ ≥ .  It may be that the marginal physical product is higher at 
firm 0, or the difference may be caused by firm 0 selling in a more profitable output 
market than firm 1; for convenience we refer to firm 0 as the efficient firm when 
1 0 φ φ > .  The wage offered by firm i is wi, i = 0,1 and is subject to minimum wage 
legislation whereby only wi ≥  w  can be chosen; throughout we assume  [ ) 1 , 0 φ ∈ w  so 
that the minimum wage does not preclude positive profits for either firm. 
Each firm also has a location (or more generally a non-wage job characteristic), a ∈ 
[0,1] for firm 0 and  [] 1 , 0 ) 1 ( ∈ −b for firm 1, so firm 0 locates at distance a from the 
left-hand end of the linear city and 1 is b  from the right-hand end.  There is a 
continuum of workers of mass 1, whose ideal job locations are uniformly distributed 
over [0, 1].  Taking a job at firm i whose location is at a distance y from a worker’s   5
ideal provides the worker with job utility 
2 ty wi − where  t > 0 is a parameter.   
Throughout we assume full employment, with each worker supplying one unit of 
labour to the firm that offers the higher job utility, so that the worker whose ideal job 




0 ) 1 ( ) ( x b t w a x t w − − − > − − , at firm 1 if 
the inequality is reversed, with indifference if there is equality.
4  If   b a − ≠1  the 
solution to the equality is x ~ in (2.1) below, and the labour market shares or 
employment levels at firm i = 0, 1 are given in (2.2); 
() () ) 1 ( 2 / 1
2
1 ~
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We use  0 / ) ( 1 0 ≥ − = t φ φ δ  to denote a measure of the between firm efficiency 
differential. 
If  b a − =1 , the firms co-locate and, when  0 > δ  we assume that the high wage firm 
gets the whole labour market if w0 ≠ w1, but the efficient firm gets the whole market 
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If  b a − =1 and 0 = δ , we follow the standard, homogeneous product, symmetric cost 
Bertrand duopoly assumption; 
                                                 
4 If the workers have a reservation utility of u, a sufficient (but not necessary) condition to ensure 
throughout our analysis that no worker would choose voluntary unemployment is  u t + > 2 1 φ , 
implicitly assumed from now on.    6




















L      (2.4) 
Firm profits are; 
  () () . , 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 L w L w − = − = φ π φ π                                                    (2.5) 
The model is a 2-stage game, where firms simultaneously choose locations first and 
then wages at the second stage. We study the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE), and 
compare with the social optimum. To avoid some implausible equilibria in the wage 
subgames when firms co-locate, we follow again a homogeneous product Bertrand 
duopoly lead (see Hurter and Lederer (1986) for a discussion) and assume throughout 
that firms cannot offer wages in excess of their marginal revenue product, so 
]. , [ ], , [ 1 1 0 0 φ φ w w w w ∈ ∈   
Ziss (1993) has analysed a 3-stage entry-location-price game in a Hotelling duopoly 
with asymmetric firm efficiency and laissez-faire (i.e. without price controls). His 
main results have exact parallels for laissez-faire (i.e.  0 = w ) in our duopsony model. 
First the SPE are as follows, analogous to Ziss (1993, Proposition 2, p. 536). 
Proposition 1 (a)If δ ∈[0, δ
*] 0 if and 81 . 0 3 3 6 * where = ≅ − = w δ , the unique (up to 
symmetry) pure strategy SPE outcome has maximum location differentiation of the 
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(b) If 0 if and * = > w δ δ , there is no SPE in pure strategies. 
 
As in the earlier symmetric efficiency duopoly model of d’Apremont et al. (1979), the 
desire of  both firms to move apart so as to soften the wage competition dominates the   7
positive effects on market share that moving toward the rival would have at constant 
wages, producing maximum differentiation SPE for δ up to δ
*.  For 
* δ δ > , the 
inefficient firm wishes again to get as far away as possible from the rival, but the 
efficient firm wants to co-locate and force the rival out of the market with a wage of 
1 φ , leading to (b).  
Turning to the social optimum and continuing to assume full employment, if b a − ≤1  
it will be socially optimal that workers at locations[ ] 0 , 0 L work for firm 0 and those 
at( ] 1 , 0 L work for 1, for some  [ ] 1 , 0 0 ∈ L . Market shares are then 0 L  and  0 1 1 L L − = , and 
social welfare is the aggregate surplus; 
[] ) 6 . 2 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 (
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Maximization of ) , , ( 0 L b a SW over [ ] 1 , 0 0 ∈ L  and  [ ]
2 1 , 0 ) , ( ∈ b a with  b a − ≤1  produces 
the social optimum market shares and locations (with 0 to the left of 1), and clearly 
there is also an optimum with the same market shares and 0 symmetrically to the right 
of 1. Proposition 2 is the result, analogous to Ziss (1993, Proposition 4(i), p.540); 
Proposition 2 The socially optimal locations and market shares are; 
(a) δ δ − = + = 4
1 0
4
1 0 , b a  or  δ δ + = − = 4
3 0
4




0 − = + = L L  if 
[ ) 4
1 , 0 ∈ δ , 
(b) [] 1 , 0 ,
0
2




0 = = L L  if  4
1 ≥ δ . 
 
With symmetric efficiency, the firms optimally locate at the quartiles, as in 
d’Apremont et al. (1979). As δ increases from 0, optimal locations remain a distance 
of  2
1 apart, the efficient firm moving towards the centre of the line and employing   8
more workers up to 4
1 = δ , at which point the efficient firm is centrally located and 
employs the whole market. 





3.       MINIMUM WAGES AND MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
 
We analyse first the Nash equilibria (NE) of stage II wage subgames at arbitrary stage 
I locations. For the laissez-faire case ( 0 = w ) we have the following lemma 3.1, 
where () [ ] { } 1 : 1 , 0 ,
2 = + ∈ = b a b a H  defines the set of locations where the firms co-
locate, so jobs are homogeneous, and ( ) [ ] { } 1 : 1 , 0 ,
2 < + ∈ = b a b a S  denotes locations 
where firms are separated with firm 0 to the left of firm 1; notice that the wage 
subgame at (a,b)  ∈  S has, from symmetry, the same outcome as that at 
[]
2 1 , 0 ) 1 , 1 ( ∈ − − b a , so the following description of  NE for (a,b) ∈ S ∪ H suffices.  
 
Lemma 3.1  The unique NE wages, market shares and profits of the stage II subgame 
at locations (a,b) under laissez-faire ( 0 = w ) is as follows; 
(a)  if (a,b) ∈ { } b a b a S b a T + − − − < ∈ = 3 )( 1 ( : ) , ( δ , then 
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(b) if  0 > δ  and (a,b) ∈ (S ∪ H)\T, then 
) 1 )( 1 ( ) , ( 1
*
0 b a b a t b a w + − − − + =φ ,           ( ) 1
*
1 , φ = b a w  
                                                 
5 The proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 use our duopsony setting and notation, and so are more 
immediately accessible for the reader of our paper. Also we correct a small error in the Ziss (1993) 
discussion of Proposition 1, and provide a proof of Proposition 2 that does not rely on the Ziss (1993) 
unproven Lagrangean concavity.   9




0 = = b a L b a L  
) 1 )( 1 ( ) , ( 1 0
*
0 b a b a t b a + − − − − − = Π φ φ ,   0 ) , (
*
1 = Π b a . 
(c) if  0 = δ  and (a,b) ∈ (S ∪ H)\T=H, then 












0 = Π = Π = = = = = b a b a b a L b a L b a w b a w φ φ  
Proof See Appendix B. 
 
Various remarks follow. First, T is the subset of locations where both firms receive 
positive market shares when  0 > δ . If  3 ≥ δ , T is empty and firm 1’s inefficiency is 
such that it never is active. If  0 = δ , T=S and both firms have positive market share 
(but zero profits) on H also
6. Figure 3.1 illustrates for  ) , 0 ( 2
1 ∈ δ , when   1 U  (defined 
later with  3 2 0 , , , a a D U ) is non-empty
7. 
 
Secondly, it follows from the formulae in Lemma 3.1 that the wages offered by both 
firms increase if either a or b increases. The intuition is standard; as the firms move 
closer together, wage competition becomes more severe as jobs are less differentiated. 
                                                 
6 This is because (2.4) now replaces (2.3). 
 
7 The upper boundary intercepts of T are  δ + − = 1 2 1 a , 1 4 1 − − = δ b ). 
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It follows that the lowest wages occur when jobs are maximally differentiated 
(a=b=0, as in the laissez-faire SPE), and that the lowest wage for either firm in any 
laissez-faire subgame is 
* *
1 w  (see Proposition 1). Thirdly, best response graphs behind 
Lemma 3.1 are upward-sloping linear functions (when market shares are positive), 
exactly as in Bhaskar and To (2003)
8, of the form  , 1 , 0 , = ≠ + = j i w w j i i β α  
where ( ) {} ) 1 ( 1 0 2
1
0 b a b a t − + − − − = φ α , ( ) { } ) 1 ( 1 1 2
1
1 b a b a t + − − − − = φ α and  2
1 = β
9. 
Thus all wage games entail strategic complementarity with equilibria that are stable in 
the usual best response dynamic, and the high wage firm will be the one with the 
higher i α , so  () ) ( ,
*
1 < > b a w ) , (
*
0 b a w  if and only if  ) ( ) , ( 0 1 U U b a ∈  where 
() ( ) ( ) {} b a b a T b a U − − − > ∈ = 1 2 : , 0 δ , ( ) ( )( ) { } b a b a T b a U − − − < ∈ = 1 2 : , 1 δ and  
1 U  is non-empty when  2
1 < δ , as shown in figure 3.1
10 where 




2 δ δ − − = − + = a a . If we restrict attention to symmetric 
locations (as do Bhaskar and To (2003)), then  b a = and the high wage firm is the 
efficient firm if  0 > δ , again as in Bhaskar and To (2003), and wages are equal 
if 0 = δ . At asymmetric locations when 0 = δ , the high wage firm is 1(0) if a>(<)b. 
When a>b (say) firm 1 gets the smaller market share at equal wages. If 1 increased its 
wage the marginal revenue would be the same as for 0 if it increased its wage, but the 
marginal cost for 1 is lower than for 0 because of its smaller market share. Thus, from 
equal wages when  0 = δ  and a>b, firm 1 has the greater incentive to raise wages, 
which leads to the NE with 0 1 w w > . At asymmetric locations when 0 > δ  and a>b, 
1’s marginal revenue (as well as its marginal cost) is lower, so the previous argument 
is no longer decisive. In fact if locations are nearly symmetric, marginal costs are 
                                                 
8 With a change of notation these are the same as in Ziss (1993, p. 528, equation (5b)). 
9 These formulae are the same as in Bhaskar and To (2003) when the mass of their high reservation 
wage workers (characterised by unemployment, assumed away in our model) is zero. 
10 The dashed curve separating  0 U and  1 U is  )} )( 1 ( 2 : ) , {(
2 b a b a R b a D − − − = ∈ = δ .   11
similar and 0’s higher marginal revenue leads to 1 0 w w > . Also if locations are close 
together, then eventually 0 will want to take the whole market, again with 1 0 w w > . 
The residual set of locations that are not too symmetric and not too close is  1 U where 
0 1 w w > . 
Leaving the laissez-faire scenario, there are, in principle, 4 types of wage subgame 
equilibria that can occur for  ) , 0 ( 1 φ ∈ w : equilibria in which the minimum wage is 
binding on neither firm (type ∅ equilibrium in what follows, equivalent to laissez-
faire), binding on both firms (type 01), binding only on firm 1 (type 1) and binding 
only on firm 0 (type 0). Clearly 
* *
1 w w ≤ will have no effect on any subgame 
equilibrium – the laissez-faire outcome will continue at all locations. As w increases 
from 
* *
1 w  it will impact first on the subgame equilibria at the maximum differentiation 
location (a=b=0) and those nearby. With a=b=0 and  0 > δ  the effect is as in Bhaskar 
and To (2003), forcing the inefficient firm to raise its wage in line with the minimum 
wage, and producing a smaller increase in the efficient firm’s wage also, because of 
the strategic complementarity, compressing the wage distribution. Thus type 1 
equilibrium emerges first at a=b=0. Eventually w  will reach a level (denoted below 
by ) 0 , 0 ( 0 w ) where it starts to bind on firm 0 also, and type 01 equilibria emerge. For 
other locations Lemma 3.2 provides a full description of the values of ( b a w , ,)  
associated with each equilibrium type for all 0 ≥ δ , illustrated in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 
later. The notation  ( ) ] 1 [ ) , (
2 2
0 0 a b t b a w − − − =φ , () ] 1 [ ) , (
2 2
1 1 b a t b a w − − − =φ  is 
used, where  ) , ( b a wi is the lowest minimum wage which binds on both firms if firm i 
is the high-wage firm under laissez-faire, as with ) 0 , 0 ( 0 w described earlier.   12
Lemma 3.2  The unique NE wages, market shares and profits of the stage II 
subgame at locations  ) , ( b a  for  ) , 0 ( 1 φ ∈ w are as follows:  
(a) if() T b a ∈ , ; 
(i)  type∅, with the laissez-faire values described in lemma 3.1(a)  




0 b a w b a w w ≤  
(ii)   type 01, with  w w w = = 1 0 ,  ( ) 0 1 2
1
0 1 , 1 L L b a L − = − + = ,      
() ( ) , 1 0 2
1
0 b a w − + − = Π φ ( )( ) b a w + − − = Π 1 1 2
1
1 φ  
iff  [] ) , ( ), , ( max 1 0 b a w b a w w ≥  




0 w w a b t w w = − − − + = φ  
   () { } ( ) , 1 1 4 / ] 1 [ 1
2 2
0 0 L b a t a b t w L − = − − − − + − = φ  
   () {} () () , , 1 8 / ] 1 [ 1 1 1
2 2 2
0 0 L w b a t a b t w − = Π − − − − + − = Π φ φ  
  iff  ) , ( ) , (
*
1 0 b a w w b a w ≥ ≥  




1 0 b a t w w w w − − − + = = φ  
   ( ) { } ( ) b a t b a t w L L L − − − − + − = − = 1 4 / ] 1 [ , 1
2 2
1 1 1 0 φ  
   () () [ ] { } () b a t b a t w L w − − − − + − = Π − = Π 1 8 / 1 ,
2 2 2
1 1 0 0 0 φ φ  
  iff  ) , ( ) , (
*
0 1 b a w w b a w ≥ ≥   
(b) if (a,b)∈(S∪H)\T the equilibrium is the laissez-faire equilibrium described in 
Lemma 3.1(b) if  0 > δ , and Lemma 3.1(c) if  . 0 = δ  
Proof See Appendix B. 
 
To find the SPE, backward induction requires the NE of the “reduced form” stage I 
location game where firm 0 chooses  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ a , firm 1 chooses  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ b  and payoffs,   13
now denoted  , 1 , 0 ), , , ( = Π i w b a i  are defined by Lemma 3.2. The resulting 
functions + + + → × ∪ Π R R H S i ) ( : are continuous, and differentiable almost 
everywhere. 
As a first step, we develop diagrams to illustrate Lemma 3.2 via the following 4 
curves in the (a,b) plane for given  ) , ( 1
* *
1 φ w w ∈
11; 






0 φ φ  






1 φ φ  
C3;  () ] 1 [ ) , (
2 2
0 0 a b t b a w w − − − = = φ  
C4;  () ] 1 [ ) , (
2 2
1 1 b a t b a w w − − − = = φ  
It is easily checked that: (a) these 4 curves intersect only on the curve D 
( ) )( 1 ( 2 b a b a − − − = δ ) in Figure 3.1, and each is a downward sloping, concave curve  
within the interior of S; (b) in  0 U , C4 is above C2 which is above C1 which is above 
C3, with the reverse ranking in  1 U . 
When  0 = δ  the curve D degenerates, intersecting S in the line 2
1 0 , < ≤ = a b a . From 
(b) above and Lemma 3.2 the following diagram emerges for a typical 
) , ( 1
* *
1 φ w w ∈ when 0 = δ , indicating the subgame equilibrium type at the various 
locations. In this case the intersection of C1-C4 at (a,a) increases monotonically from 
a=0 as 
* *
1 w w → , converging to  2
1 = a as 1 φ → w . 
                                                 
11 When  ) , 0 (
* *
1 w w ∈  all locations produce type ∅ equilibrium.   14
 
For the case  ) , ( , 0 1
* *
1 φ δ w w ∈ = , we now provide an intuitive explanation of the signs 
of the derivatives  a ∂ Π ∂ / 0 and b ∂ Π ∂ / 1 on the interiors of regions∅, 0, 1 and 01 in 
Figure 3.2, indicated by bold arrows. For∅ (laissez-faire) the usual centrifugal force 
dominates, firms wanting to move away from the rival to avoid increased wage 
competition. But at any point in 01 the minimum wage binds on both firms and 
continues to do so at nearby locations, so the increased wage competition from 
moving closer to the rival is absent, and firms now want to move towards the rival to 
increase market share. In region 0(1) the minimum wage binds only on firm 0(1), so 
the effect of the last sentence means firm 1(0) wants to move towards the rival, but 
the centrifugal force remains dominant for firm 0(1). Hence firm 1’s constrained 
location best response graph (where 1 is constrained to locate at or to the right of 0) 
follows the path C3, C1 and the vertical axis up to  0 , 1 = = b a , as a increases from 0 
to 1. Similarly the corresponding graph for firm 0 is C4, C2 and then the horizontal 
axis as b increases from 0 to 1. It follows that the intersection of C1-C4 (shown as P 
in figure 3.2) is the unique (up to symmetry) candidate for the reduced form game NE 
(the only intersection of the constrained best responses). And this is indeed the NE, 
         a 
         1 
                          C1 
               ∅              C4 
 
                
                   0 
                                                 C3 
                01                           
                             P                     C2 
                                   
                             01      1       
                                                  ∅                                      
 
                                                                      b 
 
                                                               1 
                                                          
Figure 3.2: Wage subgame equilibrium type,  0 = δ    15
since firm 1 (say) will not want to jump to a location in the relatively small region 
(length 2
1 < ) to the left of 1 where its profits will be lower, and similarly for firm 0. 
Theorem 1 If  0 = δ  and  ( ) 1
* *
1 ,φ w w ∈  the unique (up to symmetry) pure strategy SPE 
outcome has  () () 2
1
1 0 0 2
1 , / 1 = = − − = = L L t w b a φ  and  ( ). 0 2
1
1 0 w − = = φ π π  
Proof Appendix A contains a combined proof of Theorems 1 and 2. 
 
The case  0 > δ  is more complicated, and to shorten and simplify exposition in the 
remainder of this paper we restrict attention to  2
1 < δ (where  1 U  in Figure 3.1 is non-
empty). Figure 3.2 gives way to Figure 3.3, demarcated by the following critical 
minimum wages where 1 3 2 1
* *
1 φ < < < < w w w w ; 




0 2 0 1 − − + − = − + + − = − = t w t w t w .   16
When ) , ( 1
* *
1 w w w ∈ , the intersection of C1-C4 on D now lies outside S, with  2
1 < a  
and b<0. As w increases in this range, the C1-C4 intersection moves up along D but 
C3 remains outside S, touching at (0,0) when  1 w w = , whilst C2 intersects S as shown 
in figure 3.3(a), defining the boundary between type ∅ and 1 equilibria from Lemma 
3.2. As w increases in  ] , [ 2 1 w w the intersection of C1-C4 on D remains outside S with 
b<0 and  2
1 < a , converging to the point on D where b=0 and  2
1 < a as  2 w w → , but 
now C3 intersects S as in figure 3.3(b). For ] , [ 3 2 w w w ∈ the C1-C4 intersection moves 
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up round D but now in S, generating Figure 3.3(c), the intersection reaching the point 
on D where b=0 and  2
1 > a when  3 w w = . For  3 w w >  the C1-C4 intersection is again 
outside S, producing Figure 3.3(d). 
For the inefficient firm the signs of  b ∂ Π ∂ / 1 continue as in Figure 3.2 (positive in 
regions 01 and 0, negative in regions ∅ and 1), with the same intuition. Hence for 
firm 1’s constrained best response problem in the reduced form location game 
( ) , ( max 1 b a
b
Π  subject to  b a − ≤1 ), it follows that the constrained best response 
correspondence graph is, for  [ ] 1 , 0 a a∈ ; 
(a) the vertical axis from the origin to  1 a in Figure 3.3(a), 
(b) the locus  1 2 1 , , a Y Y in Figure 3.3(b), 
(c) the locus  1 3 2 1 , , , a Y Y Y in Figure 3.3(c), 
(d) the locus  1 2 1 , , a Y Y in Figure 3.3(d). 
These constrained best responses are also unconstrained best responses if  [] 2
1 , 0 ∈ a . 
When  [] 1 2
1,a a∈ , firm 1 would jump to the location in the left half of the line which is 
the constrained best response by 1 to a when 1 is constrained to locate to the left of 
firm 0.  
A new critical minimum wage appears between  3 w and  1 φ when  2
1 = a at  2 Y in Figure 
3.3(c). This is  w w = = ( ) ( ) 3 2 2
1
0 , 2 w w t ∈ + − δ δ φ , and Figure 3.4 shows in bold firm 
1’s unconstrained best response graphs
12 with w now as the demarcation between 
parts (c) and (d) of the diagram; obviously these are the only candidates for SPE 
locations. It remains to identify which (if any) points on these bold segments are also 
best responses for firm 0 in the reduced form location game. This is point P (plus its 
                                                 
12 Appendix B contains  precise statements (with proofs) of  firm 1’s constrained and unconstrained 
best responses.   18
symmetric counterpart) in Figure 3.4 (a),(b), and (c). In Figure 3.4(a) and (b), a small 
upward (downward) deviation in a by firm 0 takes us into region ∅(1), and, with the 
same intuition as in Figure 3.2, 0 ) ( / 0 > < ∂ Π ∂ a . Thus P is at least a local best location 
response for 0, and the next Theorem shows it is global. And similarly for P in Figure 
3.4(c), except downward deviations now lead to type 01 equilibrium. But in Figure 
3.4(d), the bold segments are on the 01/1 border and firm 0 now wants to move 
(locally) closer to firm 1 from all such points, precluding SPE with pure strategies. 
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Figure 3.4 Firm 1’s location best responses with minimum wages     19
Theorem 2 If  ) , 0 ( 2
1 ∈ δ  there are critical values for minimum wages 
**
12 ww < < w  
such that: 
(a) for  ) , (
* *
1 w w w ∈ the unique (up to symmetry) pure strategy SPE outcome has the 
locations  ) , ( b a P = shown in Figure 3.4(a), (b), (c), with; 
          (i) (a,b) defined by  w a w = ) 0 , (
*
1 and b=0,  , ) 0 , ( 1
*
0 0 w w a w w = > =   () 0 ,
* a L L i i =       
and  () , 1 , 0 , 0 ,
* = Π = i a i i π  if  ] , ( 2
* *
1 w w w ∈ ;   




0 b a w b a w () b a L L w w w i i , ,
*
1 0 = = = , and 
, 1 , 0 ), , (
* = Π = i b a i i π  if  ] , ( 2 w w w ∈ ; 
(b)  for  ) , ( 1 φ w w ∈ , there is no pure strategy SPE. 
Proof See Appendix A for a combined proof of Theorems 1 and 2. 
 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the effects on SPE locations of increasing the minimum wage 
from 
* *
1 w tow. When  0 = δ  locations are always symmetric, starting at maximum job 
differentiation when 
* *
1 w w = , the firms gradually moving closer together as 
w increases, converging to co-location at the centre of the line as  1 φ = → w w . Here 
minimum wages above 
* *
1 w bind on both firms, so that moving towards the rival fails 
to produce the increased wage competition of laissez-faire, removing the centrifugal 
force that dominates under laissez-faire and bringing the firms closer together as w  
increases. When  0 > δ the initial effect (forw increasing from 
* *
1 w to 2 w , along 0A) is 
that the minimum wage binds only on the inefficient firm, removing the above 
centrifugal force for the efficient firm (only) which moves towards the rival, but 
leaving the inefficient firm at the extremity. Minimum wages above  2 w bind on both   20




In all cases it is clear that the effect of increasing minimum wages is to reduce job 
differentiation (the distance  b a − − 1  between firms). The effects of the minimum 
wage on market shares also follow easily from Theorems 1 and 2; 
Corollary to Theorems 1 and 2 For δ ∈[0, 2
1 ), asw increases from 
* *
1 w tow, the effects 
on the SPE are; 
(a) a reduction in job differentiation, 
(b) an increase (decrease) in the efficient (inefficient) firm market share 
when 0 > δ , and no change in market shares when  0 = δ , 





Figure 3.5 SPE location paths as w  increases from 
* *
1 w to w 
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4. SOCIAL WELFARE AND MINIMUM WAGES 
We now turn to the impact of minimum wages on welfare. With some abuse of 
notation, let SW() w  denote the value of social welfare ( ) , , ( 0 L b a SW defined in (2.6)) 
when 0 , , L b a  are the SPE locations and market shares at minimum wage w ∈ 
], , [
* *
1 w w  and let SW( )
* *
1 w =SW
** denote its laissez-faire value and SW° its value at the 
social optimum described in Proposition 2. 
The case  0 = δ  is straightforward. From the Corollary to Theorems 1 and 2, and from  
(2.6), for  ) , [ 1 1
* *
1 φ φ t w w − = ∈ ,  2
1
0 = L and locations follow 0A in figure 3.4(a), so; 




1 a a w SW − + − =φ , where  ( ) ( ) t w b a / 1 ) ( 0 2
1 − − = = φ  
It is easy to check that  ) (w SW is strictly concave with maximum at t w 2
1
1 − =φ  where 
4




1 1 ) ( , SW t w SW w = − → → φ φ . This proves; 




1 , − ∈ φ  and strictly 
decreasing for  () 1 2
1
1 ,φ φ t w − ∈ , attaining a unique maximum and the social optimum 
(SW°) when  t w 2
1
1 − =φ ; SW() w  > SW
** for all  ) , ( 1
* *
1 φ w w ∈ . 
 
From the laissez-faire SPE, as the minimum wage increases, social welfare thus 
increases until  t w 2
1
1 − =φ  when the full social optimum is attained, and then declines 
but remains above its SPE level for all  ) , ( 1
* *
1 φ w w ∈
13. When  0 > δ  the picture is a bit 
more complicated. Note that all pure strategy SPE for w ∈  ], , [
* *
1 w w  occur in (on the 
border of) region ∅ (see Figure 3.2), so the efficient firm market share is 
                                                 
13 Alternatively in the symmetric efficiency case, maximization of social welfare is equivalent to 
minimization of aggregate commuting time, which attains the same, largest value when firms are at the 
extremes or co-locating at the middle of the line, with lower values in between and the global minimum 
at the socially optimal quartile locations.   22
) 1 ( 6 / ) 3 ( 6
1
0 b a b a L − − + − + = δ from Lemma 3.1(a). Locations now follow 0AB in 
Figure 3.4(b), producing; 
Theorem 4   Suppose  () 2
1 , 0 ∈ δ  and  ] , [
* *
1 w w w ∈ . 
(a)  SW() w  is strictly increasing for  ] , [ 2
* *
1 w w w∈ . 
(b)  If  [ ) 2
1
5
2 , ∈ δ  then SW( ) w  is strictly increasing for all 
] , [
* *
1 w w w∈  
(c)  If  () 5
2 , 0 ∈ δ  there is a unique minimum wage, 
* w  say, which 
maximizes SW( ) w  over  ] , [
* *
1 w w w∈ ; at 
* w , a+b > . 2
1  
(d)  SW() w  > SW
** for all  ] , [
* *
1 w w w∈ . 
(e)  SW° > SW( ) w   for all  ] , [
* *
1 w w w∈ . 
Proof See Appendix A. 
 
Hence, as the minimum wage increases from  ,
* *
1 w  the effect is to increase social 




2 , ∈ δ (part (b)).  If  () 5
2 , 0 ∈ δ  the minimum wage (again up to the limit  ) w w =  
always improves on laissez-faire (part (d)), but now the improvement is not 
monotonic over the whole w  range (parts (a) and (c)), social welfare reaching a 
maximum at some ( ) w w w ,
* *
1
* ∈ , similar to Theorem 2.  Although minimum wages 
(up to the pure strategy existence limit) always improve on laissez-faire, they never 
now allow attainment of the full social optimum (part (e)). 
The above shows that in the “long-run”, via its impact on the non-wage job 
characteristic, the imposition of a minimum wage is welfare-improving over laissez-
faire.    23
It is instructive to consider also the “short-run” impact, where we assume that the 
locations remain fixed at the laissez-faire maximum differentiation. When 0 = δ , from 
Lemma 3.2 (a)(ii) and Figure 3.2, the short-run (subgame) equilibrium is type 01 with 
equal market shares for all  ) , ( 1
* *
1 φ w w ∈ . Hence, asw  increases, there is no effect on 
welfare in the short-run, and the above beneficial long-run effects are therefore due to 
the effects of the minimum wage on locations. Again when  0 > δ  the picture is 
different, and indeed the short-run effect is disadvantageous to welfare. Note first that 
with  a=b=0, (2.6) becomes the following, strictly concave function of  0 L  whose 
maximum is at ) 1 ( 2
1
0 δ + = L ; 






0 1 0 0 0 L L t L L L SW − + − − + = φ φ  






0 δ δ + < + = L , and so 
provides too low a share to the efficient firm in the short-run (i.e. given a=b=0). 
Because firms cannot perfectly wage discriminate among workers, the efficient firm 
does not internalise all social gains that are associated with a wage increase. As a 
result the wage premium offered by the efficient firm in the SPE is too low and its 
market share is too low. But minimum wages above 
* *
1 w  bind first (for  ) , ( 1
* *
1 w w w ∈ , 
see Figure 3.3(a)) only on the inefficient firm, increasing its wage more than that of 
the efficient rival, compressing the wage differential and decreasing the efficient firm 
market share ( {} t t w L 4 / 0 0 + − = φ , see Lemma 3.2), thus reducing welfare in the 
short-run. Eventually the minimum wage binds on both firms (Figure 3.3(b), (c), (d)), 
market shares are equalised and welfare remains constant thereafter. Formally, define 
short-run social welfare as  ) , 0 , 0 ( ) ( 0 L SW w SSW = where  0 L  is its subgame 
equilibrium value at locations a=b=0 and minimum wage w . We have shown;   24
Theorem 5 For  ) , ( 1
* *
1 φ w w ∈   ) (w SSW  is constant everywhere if  0 = δ , and if  0 > δ , 
) (w SSW is strictly decreasing for ) , ( 1
* *
1 w w w ∈ , and constant for  ) , [ 1 1 φ w w ∈ . 
 
Thus in the short-run minimum wages cannot be beneficial to social welfare, and the 
positive long run welfare impact of minimum wages is therefore totally driven by and 
dependent on the effect of minimum wages on the non-wage job characteristics. 
Moreover, the change in job characteristics turns the policy’s impact on market shares 
upside down; since the efficient firm moves closer to the centre when the minimum 
wage binds on its rival, its market share increases relative to laissez-faire. 
Theorems 3 and 4 relate to social welfare in aggregate; finally we note the 
consequences for individual firms and workers. Not surprisingly firm profits fall as 
the minimum wage increases. The worker located at 0 sees the wage increase from 
laissez-faire, but the commuting time also increases as we move up the SPE paths 
shown in figure 3.5. However the net effect is advantageous
14, and this worker is the 
most likely to suffer a utility loss; hence all workers are better off.  
Theorem 6  Suppose δ ∈[0, 2
1 ) and  ) , ( 1
* *
1 φ w w ∈ . As w  increases, SPE profits of both 
firms decline, but the utility of all workers increases. 
Proof See Appendix A. 
 
 6.  CONCLUSIONS 
We have shown how the imposition of minimum wages can be welfare improving on 
laissez-faire, because of their impact on firms’ choice of non-wage job characteristics.  
In the context of a Hotelling duopsony, jobs are horizontally differentiated (e.g. by 
                                                 
14 In the vertical job differentiation model of de Fraja (1999) this is not so – minimum wage workers 
may end up worse off because of the deterioration in working conditions.   25
location) and the effect of the minimum wage is to narrow the gap between locations 
chosen by firms compared to the maximum differentiation chosen under laissez-faire , 
in a welfare improving way.  The paper thus provides a new route through which 
minimum wages can be “a good thing”. Following the quite different labour market 
model of de Fraja (1999), the paper also generates a natural question for further 
research in the differentiated oligopsony framework, namely the effect of minimum 
wages on vertically differentiated job characteristics, as opposed to, or in addition to, 
our horizontal differentiation. 
REFERENCES 
 
Bhaskar, V., and T. To (1999), “Minimum wages for Ronald McDonald monopolies: 
a theory of monopsonistic competition”, Economic Journal, 109, 190-203. 
 
Bhaskar, V., and T. To (2003), “Oligopsony and the distribution of wages”, European 
Economic Review, 47, 371-399. 
 
d’Aspremont, C., J-J. Gabszewicz and J-F. Thisse (1979), “On Hotelling’s stability in 
competition”, Econometrica, 47, 1145-1150. 
  
de Fraja, G., (1999), “Minimum wage legislation, productivity and employment”, 
Economica, 66, 473-88. 
 
Delfgaauw, J. (2007), “The effect of job satisfaction on job search; not just whether, 
but also where”, Labour Economics, 14, 299-317. 
 
Kaas, L., and P. Madden (2008), “Hold-up in oligopsonistic labour markets – a new 
role for the minimum wage”, Labour Economics, forthcoming. 
 
Lederer, P.J. and A.P. Hurter(1986), “Competition of firms; discriminatory pricing 
and location”, Econometrica, 53(3), 623-640. 
 
Manning, A. (2003), Monopsony in Motion, Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
 
Walsh, F. (2003), “Comment on ‘Minimum wages for Ronald McDonald 
monopsonies; a theory of monopsonistic competition’“, Economic Journal, 113, 718-
722. 
 
Ziss, S. (1993), “Entry deterrence, cost advantage and horizontal product 
differentiation”, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 23, 523-543.   26
Appendix A: Proofs of the main theorems 
Proof of Theorems 1 and 2 The proof involves a number of steps.   
Step 1 We have the following derivatives  a ∂ Π ∂ / 0 when ( ) . , T b a ∈  
(A) In region ∅,  ) , ( ) , (
*













⎛ − + +
− −













 whose sign is 
that of F(a,b) =  () ( ) . 3 1 1 b a b a + + − − − δ  When  0 > δ  the curve F(a,b) = 0 intersects 
the boundary of T where  () ( ) b a b a + − − − = 3 1 δ uniquely at  , 2
1 = a   , 1 4 9 2
1 − − = δ b  
the boundary of T where a = 0 uniquely at  , 1 δ − = b  and is downward sloping in T 
between these intercepts;  0 /
*
0 > ∂ Π ∂ a to the right of the curve and  0 /
*
0 < ∂ Π ∂ a to the 
left. When  0 = δ ,  0 /
*
0 < ∂ Π ∂ a everywhere on S. 
(B) In region 01, () 0 / 0 2
1
0 > − = ∂ Π ∂ w a φ . 
(C) In region 1,  a ∂ Π ∂ / 0 has the sign of  ( )( ). 3 1 1 0 a b b a t w − − − − + − φ   But in region 
1,  () ], 1 [
2 2
0 a b t w − − − <φ so  ( )( ). 1 1 0 a b b a t w + − − − > − φ  It follows that 
0 / 0 > ∂ Π ∂ a  since ( ) b a b a a b + > − + > + − 1 i.e. 1 3 1 . 
(D)  In region 0,  a ∂ Π ∂ / 0 has the sign of  ( ) ( ). 1 1
2 w b a t − − − − φ  But in region 0, 
, ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
2
1 b a t b a b a t w − − > + − − − > − φ  so  0 / 0 < ∂ Π ∂ a . 
Step 2 Suppose  ∅ = ∈ ]( , ( 2
* *
1 w w w  if  0 = δ ). From Figure 3.3(a), (b), the positive 
derivatives in (B) and (C) above imply that b=0 (or, symmetrically, 1) in any SPE. 
Given b=0, (A), (B) and (C) above imply that the point P in Figure 3.4 (a), (b) is the 
best response of firm 0 amongst ] , 0 [ 1 a a∈ . Amongst ] 1 , [ 1 a a∈ , firm 0’s best response 
to b=0 is to co-locate (a=1), from Lemma 3.1(b), so P will be the unique SPE location 
(up to symmetry) firm 0’s profits at P  exceed those at a=1, b =0. The required   27
inequality becomes   () ( ) 0 18 3 1 ) , (
2
1 ≥ − + + − = − δ δ δ
a a a a H , where a is its value at P, 
certainly in  ] , 0 [ 2




1] , 0 [ ) , ( ∈ δ a . It is easy to check H is decreasing in both a and δ on this domain, 
and 0 ) , ( 2
1
2
1 > H , proving (a)(i). 
Step 3 Consider now  ] , [ 2 w w w ∈ , and for convenience let (a
*, b
*) denote P, shown in 
Figure 3.2 for  0 = δ  and Figure 3.4(c) for  0 > δ ; note  2
1 * < b . From (C) and (D), P is 
the only remaining SPE candidate (up to symmetry). The maximum possible value of 
1 4 9 2
1
2 2
1 * − − < − = δ δ b , so a
* is the best response by 0 to b
* over  T b a ∈ ) , (
* .  
We show next that firm 0 does not want to deviate from P to co-locate; this requires, 










+ − + − − = Π
b a
b a b a t b a  
where ) )( 1 ( 2 b a b a − − − = δ .  Equivalently, 
  ) ( ) 1 ( 36 18 ]
1
3 [ ) 1 (
2 b a b a
b a
b a b a − − − = ≥
− −
+ − + − − δ
δ
 
which becomes  0 ] ) ( 1 [
2 ≥ − − b a , and clearly is satisfied.  It remains to show that firm 
0 does not want to deviate from P to any location strictly to the right of firm 1. From 
symmetry the profits attainable by firm 0 from such right deviations are the same as 
when firm 1 is at 
* 1 b −  and firm 0 chooses strictly to the left of firm 1.  From step 1 
the only candidates for local maxima of  ) , ( 0 b a Π  on this latter set are; 
(a)  along the ∅/1 border (C2) to the right of P 
(b)  in ∅ with a=0 if  . 1 1 ) (
* * δ − < − < b b  
The proof of (a) (ii) is completed by showing; 
(i)  along the ∅/1 border firm 0’s profits decrease with b. 
(ii)  in ∅ where a = 0 and  . 0 / , 1 0 < ∂ Π ∂ − < b b δ    28





3 [ ) 1 (
b a
b a b a t
− −
+ − + − − =
δ
, 






1 b a b a t b a w w + − − − − + = = φ φ  so that  
) 2 /( ) 1 ( / a b db da − + − = , and  ) 3 ( ) 1 ( b a b a + − − − < δ . 
Differentiating  ) , ( 0 b a Π totally with respect to b and using the da/db expression 
shows that  ( ) ) 9 ( 1 if 0 / 0 b a b a db d + − − − < < Π δ  which follows since 
) 3 ( ) 1 ( b a b a + − − − < δ . 
For (ii): it follows straightforwardly that, with a = 0, 
( ) . 3 5 1 / iff 0 / 0 b b b − < − < ∂ Π ∂ δ  Using the restriction  δ − < 1 b , 
b b + < − 1 ) 1 /( δ and the required inequality follows as b < 1. 
Finally, for ∅ = ∈ ( ) , ( 1 φ w w if 0 = δ ), (B) and (C) ensure that P in Figure 3.4(d) (the 
only candidate) is not an equilibrium completing (b).         
 
Proof of Corollary to Theorems 1 and 2 (a) is established in the text. For (b), from 
Theorem 1, the efficient firm market share when  0 > δ and  [ ] 2
* *
1 ,w w w ∈  (along 0A in 
Figure 3.4) is  )) 1 /( 3 ( 6
1
0 a a L − + + = δ , which is increasing in a, in turn increasing in 
w . When  0 > δ and  [ ] w w w , 2 ∈  (along AB in Figure 3.5), the SPE value of 0 L is 
defined by (from Theorem 1); 
) 2 ( ) )( 1 ( 2
) 1 ( )) 1 /( 3 ( 6
1
0
b a b a
b a b a L
− − − =










































So along AB as b increases, a increases, w increases and  0 L increases.                         29
Proof of Theorem 4 




0 + = L ) into SW(a, 








1 * * 1 / δ δ β + + − =
− t SW t  
(a) For  ], , [ 2
* *
1 w w w ∈  SPE locations are b  = 0 and a = a( ) w , where a() w  is 






1 a a t a w w − − − + = = φ φ  It follows that 
()
1 1 ) 2 4 ( 3 '
− − − = a t w a > 0.  Social welfare can then be written as the following 
function of a, on the domain  [ ) 2


















0 1 0 0 L a L a t L L a SW − + − + − − + = φ φ  
Since  0 ) ( ' > w a it suffices to show that  ' SW (a) > 0 on its domain.  Differentiation 
and manipulation produces 
) ( ' 36













Since  a a 2 ) 1 /( ≥ − δ  on the domain,
2 2 2 20 20 10 , 20 ) 1 /( 5 a a a a − ≥ ≥ − δ δ , and so; 
 0 15 6 9 ) ( ' 36
2 1 > − − ≥
− a a a SW t  since [ ), , 0 2
1 ∈ a completing the proof of (a). 
(b)/(c) For  () w w w , 2 ∈ SPE locations are  ( ) w a  and b = b(a) where b(a) is defined by 
) )( 1 ( 2 b a b a − − − = δ  for  ] ), 2 1 1 ( ( 2
1
2
1 δ − − ∈ a  and (e.g.)  ( ) w a  is defined  by 






1 a b a a b a t a b a w w + − − − − + = = φ φ . From the  ) (a b  
definition ) 2 1 /( ) 2 1 ( ) ( ' b a a b − − = , and it follows from  () ) ( ,
*
1 a b a w w =  that 
() 0 ) 1 )( 2 1 ( '
1 1
2
1 > − − − =
− − b a b t w a . Now social welfare is the following function of 
a, where  ( ) ] , 2 1 1 ( 2
1
2
1 δ − − ∈ a ,  ) (a b b = and ) 1 ( 2
1
0 a b L + − = , and where b increases 
from 0 to  2 / 2
1 δ − as a increases over its domain;   30








0 1 0 0 L b a L b a t L L − − + − + + − − +φ φ  
Since  0 ) ( ' > w a it suffices again to show that  0 ) ( ' > a SW  on its domain. 




1 2 2 1 ) 1 ( ) 2 1 ( ) 2 1 ( ) ( ) ( ' ) 2 1 ( b a a b b a b a a SW b t − − + − − − − − = −
− δ  
Substituting  ) 1 /( 2
1 b a b a − − = − δ ,  s=a+b (which increases from ( ) δ 2 1 1 2
1 − −  to 
2 / 1 δ − as a varies over its domain) and manipulating: 
 ), ( ) 1 )( 1 2 ( 4 ) 5 3 ( ) ( ' ). 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 8
3 2 2 1 s m s s s a SW b s t = − − − − = − −
− δ say 
It is easy to check that  () 0 > s m for ( ) ] , 2 1 1 ( 2
1
2
1 δ − − ∈ s , that m(s)<0 for  5
3 > s ,that 
0 ) ( ' < s m for [] 5
3
2
1, ∈ s , and that   ) 2 / 1 ( δ − m has the sign of  2 5 − δ . Hence, if  5
2 ≥ δ , 
m(s) is positive over its domain, proving (b). If  ) , 0 ( 5
2 ∈ δ  m(s) has a unique maximum 
at some ( ) 2 / 1 , 2
1 δ − ∈ s , so  2
1 > +b a , which corresponds to a unique maximum of 
SW(a) over its domain; (c) follows with 
* w as the associated minimum wage.  
(d)  From (a), (b) and (c) it suffices to show that  ( ) .
* * SW w SW >  At  , w  
2 / , 2
1
2
1 δ − = = b a  and the required inequality becomes after manipulation; 
0 9 18 45 20 ) (
2 3 < − + − = y y y y n  
where  ( ). 1 , 0 2 / ∈ = δ y   Now n(0) < 0, n(1) < 0, n is concave on [] , , 0 4
3  convex on 
[] . 1 , 4
3  A straightforward calculation shows that at the unique stationary point on 
[] 0 ) ( , , 0 4
3 < y n  which ensures the result. 
(e)  This follows since at the unique social optimum  2
1 = +
o o b a  whereas at the 
SPE location which maximizes social welfare  . 2
1 > +b a       
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Proof of Theorem 6 The fall in profit is immediate from Theorem 1 when  0 = δ . 
From Theorem 2(a)(i), when  0 > δ  and  ] , ( 2
* *
1 w w w ∈ ,  ( ) , 1 , 0 , 0 ,
* = Π = i a i i π  and a 
increases along OA in Figure 3.4(b) asw increases in this range. It is easy to check 
that  ) 0 , (
* a i Π is decreasing in a ( ) 2
1 < , so profits fall as w increases. Similarly, from 
Theorem 2(a)(ii) when  0 > δ  and  ] , ( 2 w w w ∈ ,  , 1 , 0 ), , (
* = Π = i b a i i π  with (a,b) 
increasing along AB in Figure 3.4(b) asw increases in this range. Along AB 
) )( 1 ( 2 b a b a − − − = δ , so  ) 2 1 /( ) 2 1 ( / b a da db − − = , and it is easy to check that 
) , (
* b a i Π  is decreasing as a ( ) 2
1 <  increases along AB, so again profits fall as w  
increases. 
If ) , , , ( 1 0 w w b a are their SPE values when  ) , ( 1
* *
1 φ w w ∈ , the equilibrium utility of the 
workers at the extreme locations is, with obvious notation, 
2
0 ) 0 ( ta w u − =  and 
2
1 ) 1 ( tb w u − = .  Since  ) , , , ( 1 0 w w b a never decrease asw increases in this range, it is 
clear that the extreme workers are the most likely to suffer a utility loss from an 
increase in the minimum wage since their commuting times increase the most. But 
when  0 = δ , and using Theorem 1,  0 1 / ) 1 ( / ) 0 ( > − = ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ a w u w u , so the utility of 
all workers increases monotonically with w . When  0 > δ  the worker at 0 is 
unambiguously most likely to suffer a utility fall, because an increase in the minimum 
wage produces a smaller wage increase but larger increase in commuting time than 
that for the worker at 1. Using Theorem 2 it is easy to check that u(0) is again 
monotonically increasing in w , both for  ] , ( 2
* *
1 w w w ∈  (Theorem 2(a)(i), along OA in 
Figure 3.4(b)) and for  ] , ( 2 w w w ∈  (Theorem 2(a)(ii), along AB in Figure 3.4(b)). 
Again the utility of all workers increases monotonically with w .                             
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Appendix B: Proofs of lemmas and propositions 
Proof of Lemma 3.1   
For a wage subgame with location (a,b) ∈ S, we first show that the following (i) – (iii) 
describe firm 0’s best responses and (iv) – (vi) those of firm 1, where 
() () , 3 1 1 0 b a b a t − + − − − =φ γ  
() () , 1 1 1 0 b a b a t + − − − + = Λ φ ( )( ), 3 1 0 1 b a b a t + − − − − =φ γ
() () ; 1 1 0 1 a b b a t + − − − + = Λ φ  
(i) ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 0 b a b a t w w + − − − + =         1 1 if γ < w  
(ii)  ( ) {} [ ) 1 1 1 1 0 2
1
0 , if ) 1 ( 1 Λ ∈ − + − − − + = γ φ w b a b a t w w  
(iii)  [] 0 0 , 0 φ = w               1 1 if w ≤ Λ  
(iv)  = 1 w ) 1 )( 1 ( 0 b a b a t w − + − − +         0 0 if γ < w  
(v)  () {} [ ) 0 0 0 0 1 2
1
1 , if ) 1 ( 1 Λ ∈ + − − − − + = γ φ w b a b a t w w  
(vi)  [ ] 1 1 , 0 φ = w               0 0 if w ≤ Λ  
From the definitions of  ; ~ and 0 x π  
(1) 0 0 = π    ] ) 1 [( i.e. , 0 ~ if
2 2
1 0 a b t w w x − − − ≤ ≤  
(2) () x w ~
0 0 0 − = φ π




1 b a t w w a b t w x − − + ≤ < − − − ∈  
(3)  0 0 0 w − =φ π   0
2 2
1 ] ) 1 [( i.e. , 1 ~ if w b a t w x ≤ − − + ≥  
It is easy to check that (1), (2) and (3) define  0 π as a continuous, quasi-concave 
function of w0 over the whole range [0, 0 φ ] (constant at 0 over the range of (1), strictly 
concave over (2) and linear, decreasing over (3)). 
If  , 0 ~ then 1 1 ≤ Λ ≥ x w  and so  , 0 0 0 = = π L  for all  [ ] 0 0 , 0 φ ∈ w .  Thus any  [] 0 0 , 0 φ ∈ w  
is a best response for firm 0 to  . 1 1 Λ ≥ w  If  1 1 Λ < w  then strictly positive profits are   33
attainable by firm 0 (by choosing  ε ε φ , 0 0 − = w small enough), and a best response 
must lie in the range of (2) above.  In this range,  0 π is a strictly concave function of 




0 a b t w w − − − + = φ  which lies in the range of 
(2), and so is the best response, iff  [ ). , 1 1 1 Λ ∈ γ w   If  0 1 1 ,π γ < w  is increasing over the 
range of (2) so the maximum of  0 π  occurs at  ] ) 1 [(
2 2
1 0 b a t w w − − + = , which is 
therefore the best response.  Interchanging 0/1 subscripts, a/b and  , / 1 0 φ φ  and 
replacing  () x by x ~ 1 ~ −  produces the firm 1 result.  Thus the set of subgame NE for 
(a,b) ∈ S correspond to simultaneous solutions of one of (i) – (iii) with one of (iv) – 
(vi), where  [] [ ]. , 0 and , 0 1 1 0 0 φ φ ∈ ∈ w w   
(a) Assume  (a,b) ∈ T and consider the (ii)/(v) pairing.  The equations intersect at 
() 1 , 0 , ,
* = = i b a w w i i  and the resulting w0,  w1 satisfy the inequalities in (ii)/(v) iff 
() () ( ) () . , or 3 1 T b a b a b a ∈ + − − − < δ   It is straightforward to check that no pairings 
produce any other NE for (a,b) ∈ T, which completes the proof of (a), using the NE 
wages to derive the corresponding market shares and profits.   
(b) Assume  (a,b) ∈ S/T.  Consider the (i)/(vi) pairing where w1 =  1 φ  in (vi).  The 
resulting wages ( ) 1 1
2 2
1 0 ], ) 1 [( φ φ = − − + = w b a t w  satisfy the required inequalities iff 
() () . 3 1 b a b a + − − − > δ   The (ii)/(vi) pairing with  1 1 φ = w  produces 
() [ ] {} 1 1
2 2
1 0 0 , 1
2
1
φ φ φ = − − − + = w a b t w , which satisfies the inequalities iff 
() () , 3 1 b a b a + − − − = δ  in which case w0 =  ]. ) 1 [(
2 2
1 b a t − − + φ  Again one can check 
that no pairings produce other NE for (a,b) ∈ S/T and that the NE wages produce the 
market shares and profits in (b).  Consider now the case (a,b)  ∈ H .  From the 
definition of L0 for this case, if  1 1 φ = w , firm 0 attains  0 1 0 0 > − = φ φ π with w0 =  1 φ ,   34
which cannot be improved upon 
() . 0 , 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 = ⇒ < − < − = ⇒ > π φ φ φ φ π φ w w w   If  , 1 0 φ = w  firm 1 can do no 
better than choose , 1 1 φ = w  giving  . 0 1 = π   Thus  1 1 0 φ = = w w is a NE.  This is the 
unique NE: if  1 0 1 1 then w w w = <φ is again 0’s best response giving  , 0 1 = π but 
() 0 , 1 1 > < + ε φ ε w  strictly improves for 1; market shares and profits are as claimed, 
completing the proof.        
Discussion and Proof of Proposition 1 
To find the SPE of the laissez-faire game we need the NE of the “reduced form” stage 
I location game where firm 0 chooses a ∈ [0, 1], firm 1 chooses b ∈ [0, 1] and 
payoffs are given by  ) , (
* b a i Π in lemma 3.1.  It turns out that the inefficient firm 
always wants to locate as far as possible from the rival, because of the usual 
centrifugal force; it moves away to soften wage competition and avoid the zero profits 
near co-location. In contrast, the efficient firm gets positive profits when it co-locates, 
and these can overcome the centrifugal tendency. If δ is small ( 4 / 1 < δ ) the 
centrifugal force dominates. But if ] , 4 / 1 [
* δ δ ∈ 81 . 0 3 3 6 * where ≅ − = δ , the 
efficient firm co-locates if the rival is near the mid-point (b=1/2) and the centrifugal 
force is therefore small since th efficient firm cannot get “very far” from the rival; 
otherwise it moves to the extremity.  Lemmas B.1 and B.2 provide the formal 
statements. 
Lemma B.1  The best response of firm 1 in the reduced form stage I game when 







5 1 , 0 and if 1 , if 0 is , , 0 = = > = < = ∈ a if b a b a b δ . 
Proof We look first at the “constrained best response” of the inefficient firm in this 
game, which solves:   35




Π  s.t.  . 1 0 a b − ≤ ≤   We denote this solution  ), ( 1 a ψ  and  ) ( ~
1 a Π  are the 
resulting profits. 
For  [] () 0 , , 1 ,
*
1 = Π ∈ b a a a for all  [ ], 1 , 0 a b − ∈ so  ( ) [ ] . 0 ) ( ~ 1 , 0 1 1 = Π − = a and a a ψ   
For  [ ), , 0 a a∈  firm 1 can attain positive profit only by choosing b so that (a,b) ∈ T, 
but then, from lemma 3.1(b); 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1 / 3 1 1 / 3 / 18
1 *
1 < − − − − − − − − − + − = ∂ Π ∂ b a b a b a b a t b δ δ  
Thus  () [ ), , 0 for 0 , ) ( ~ and 0 ) (
*
1 1 1 a a a a a ∈ Π = Π = ψ  completing the description of firm 
1’s constrained best responses.  The function  ) ( ~
1 a Π  thus defined is easily seen to be 
continuous, strictly decreasing on [ ) a , 0  and constant at 0 on [ ]. 1 , a  
In firm 1’s unconstrained best response problem, it can also choose  [] . 1 , 1 a b − ∈  From 
symmetry the maximum attainable profit over this b interval is  () , 1 ~
1 a − Π  and the 
unconstrained best response profit for firm 1 is max ( ) [ , ~
1 a Π   ( )] a − Π 1 ~
1  attained at the 
best responses  ( ) ( ) a a a if a − − − Π > Π 1 1 , 1 ~ ) ( ~ ) ( 1 1 1 1 ψ ψ  if  ) ( ~ ) 1 ( ~
1 1 a a Π > − Π  and at 
() {} ). 1 ( ~ ) ( ~ if 1 1 ), ( 1 1 1 1 a a a a − Π = Π − −ψ ψ  When  , , 2
1
4
5 > < a δ  which completes the 
proof of the Lemma.                                                                                                     
 
Lemma B.2  The best response of firm 0 in the reduced form stage I game is; 







1 if 1 , 0 , if 1 , if 0 , , 0 = = > = < = ∈ b a b a b a δ   
(b) for  [ ], ,
*
4
1 δ δ ∈  there is a strictly decreasing function b(δ) with  () , 2
1
4
1 = b  
( ) 0
* = δ b such that a = 0 if b < b(δ),  a = { }( )b a b b b − = = − 1 , if 1 , 0 δ if 
() () , ) ( 1 , δ δ b b b − ∈  a = {} ( ) δ δ b b a b b b − > = − = − 1 if 1 and ) ( 1 if 1 , 1  
Proof Suppose  . 0
* δ δ ≤ <  From lemma 3.1 we have;    36
(i)  () 0 1 2 /
*
0 > − = ∂ Π ∂ a t a  when (a, b) ∈ (S ∪ H)\T and a < 1. 












⎛ − + +
− −














whose sign coincides with that of F(a,b) =  ( )( ). 3 1 1 b a b a + + − − − δ  The curve F(a,b) 
= 0 intersects the boundary of T where  ( )( ) b a b a + − − − = 3 1 δ uniquely at  , 2
1 = a  
, 1 4 9 2
1 − − = δ b  the boundary of T where a = 0 uniquely at  , 1 δ − = b  and is 
downward sloping in T between these intercepts when  . 4
3 ≤ δ  For  ], , (
*
4
3 δ δ ∈  the 
curve slopes down when 3a+2b > 1, but is upward sloping when 3a+2b < 1 (with a 
turning point at b = 2 -  δ 3,   a =  3
1 (1-2b)).  In each case,  0 /
*
0 > ∂ Π ∂ a to the right of 
the curve and  0 /
*
0 < ∂ Π ∂ a to the left. 
Consider 0’s constrained best response problem:  ( ) [] . 1 , 0 s.t. , max
*
0 b a b a
a
− ∈ Π  Define 




0 b b b − Π − Π on the domain  ( ]



























b t b G  
































































Thus there is a decreasing function b(δ) on the domain  ] , 0 (
* δ δ ∈  such that b=b(δ) iff 
G(b,δ)=0, b < b(δ) iff G(b,δ) > 0 and b > b(δ) iff G(b,δ) < 0.  Moreover  ()1 lim
0 =
→ δ
δ b  
(since  G(1,δ)  → 0 as δ→0),  ( ) 2
1
4
1 = b   ( ) ( ) 0 , since 4
1
2
1 = G  and  ( ) 0




1 when 0 ] 18 3 [ , 0 δ δ δ δ δ = = − + = t G ).   37
In the case where  ( ], , 0 4
3 ∈ δ  the derivative signs in (i) and (ii), and the downward 
slope of the curve F(a,b) = 0 imply that a = 0 and a = 1-b are the only 2 candidates for 
0’s constrained best response when  ], 1 , 0 [ δ − ∈ b and it follows from the previous 
paragraph that a = 0 if b < b(δ),  { } b a − = 1 , 0  if b=b(δ) and a = 1-b if b > b(δ).  

















is continuous and strictly decreasing in b, 
and  β α − = − Π ) , 1 (
*
0 b b independent of b.  When  ( ) ( ) 2
1
4
1 , , 0 > ∈ δ δ b  and using the 
symmetry of the (a,b) and (1-a, 1-b) subgames, 0’s unconstrained best response is as 





1 , , ≤ ∈ δ δ b  and the symmetry ensures the 
unconstrained best response of (b). 
When  ], , (
*
4
3 δ δ ∈  the above arguments ensure the unconstrained best responses in 
(b) if  ]. 1 , 3 2 [ if or ] 1 , 0 [ δ δ − ∈ − ∈ b b  When  ( ) δ δ 3 2 , 1 − − ∈ b  the candidates 
for 0’s constrained best response are a= 1-b and the value of a where (a,b) ∈ T is on 
the upward sloping part of the F(a,b) = 0 curve; let a = a(b) denote this curve, defined 
by F(a,b) = 0 and 3a+2b < 1 for  ( ). 3 2 , 1 δ δ − − ∈ b  Along this curve 0’s profit is 
() () b b a ,
*
0 Π  whose derivative with respect to b is –4(1-a-b) < 0.  Also 
( ) ( ) 0 1 8 9 8 , 1 9
1 < − − − = − δ δ δ δ t G so  ( ) , 1 δ δ − < b  and a = 1-b is 0’s constrained 
best response to any b > b(δ), as in the last paragraph, producing again the (b) 
statement.           
Best response graphs are shown in Figures B.1 and B.2.   38
  
 
               Figure B.2; 0’s laissez-faire best location response graph 
Superimposing figure B.1 on figure B.2 (a) or (b) establishes Proposition 1(a) when  
 
0 > δ , and it is straightforward to extend arguments for  0 = δ .   On the other hand,  
 
when 
* δ δ > , the simultaneous-move location game has no equilibrium in pure  
 
strategies: firm 1 wants to locate as far as possible from firm 0, and firm 0 wants to  
 
co-locate with firm 1. 
 
REMARK; Ziss (1993) suggests that figure B.2 (a) is 0’s best response graph for all  
 
] , 0 [









1 δ δ ≤ ≤  
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(a)  4
1 0 < < δ   
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Figure B.1; 1’s laissez-faire best location response graph   39
 
Proof of Lemma 3.2 
 For  (a, b) ∈ S, Lemma 3.1(a) and the quasi-concavity of  i π  as a function of wi 
noted in its proof ensure that the best responses of firm 0 are described by (i) – (iii) 
below, and those of firm 1 by (iv)-(vi): 
 (i)  ]] ) 1 [( , max[
2 2
1 0 b a t w w w − − + =    1 1 if γ < w  
 (ii)  [ ] {} ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − − − + =
2 2
1 0 0 ) 1 (
2
1
, max a b t w w w φ   [ ) 1 1 1 , if Λ ∈ γ w  
 
 (iii)  [] 0 0 ,φ w w =        1 1 if w ≤ Λ  
 
 (iv)  ]] ) 1 [( , max[
2 2
0 1 a b t w w w − − + =    0 0 if γ < w  
 
 (v)  [ ] {} ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − − − + =
2 2
0 1 1 ) 1 (
2
1
, max b a t w w w φ   [ ) 0 0 0 , if Λ ∈ γ w  
 
 (vi)  [ ] 1 1 ,φ w w =        0 0 if w ≤ Λ  
 
Thus NE for subgames with (a, b) ∈ S and  ] , 0 ( 1 φ ∈ w  correspond to solutions for 
[] [ ] 1 1 0 0 , , , φ φ w w w w ∈ ∈  of one of (i)-(iii) coupled with one of (iv)-(vi). 
(a) Suppose  (a, b) ∈ T.  Comparing the above best responses (i)-(vi) with those of 
Lemma 3.1(a) it is immediate that the laissez-faire outcomes continue as NE iff 




0 b a w b a w w ≤ completing the proof of (i). 
Solutions with  w w w = = 1 0 can be generated by the (ii)/(v) pairing iff: 
 
(1) () ] 1 [ ) , (
2 2
0 0 a b t b a w w − − − = ≥ φ  (2) ( ) ] 1 [ ) , (
2 2
1 1 b a t b a w w − − − = ≥ φ   
 
(3)  ) 3 )( 1 ( 0 1 b a b a t w + − − − − = ≥ φ γ           (4)  ) 3 )( 1 ( 1 0 b a b a t w − + − − − = ≥ φ γ  
 
But (1) ⇒ (3) and (2) ⇒ (4).  Thus (ii)/(v) produce NE with  w w w = = 1 0  (and the 
corresponding market shares and profits in (ii)) iff (1) and (2) hold.  It is straight   40
forward to check that no pairings produce other NE with  w w w = = 1 0 , completing the 
proof of (ii). 
The (ii)/(v) pairing produces solutions with  1 0 w w w = ≥ iff  
 
() [ ] {} w w a b t w w = − − − + = 1
2 2




(5) () ] 1 [ ) , (
2 2
0 0 a b t b a w w − − − = ≤ φ       (6) ) 3 )( 1 ( 0 1 b a b a t w + − − − − = ≥ φ γ  





b a t w w − − − + ≥ φ            (8) ) 3 )( 1 ( 1 0 0 0 b a b a t w − + − − − = ≥ > Λ φ γ  
 
Substitution of w0 shows (7) is equivalent to  ). , (
*
1 b a w w ≥  For (a,  b)  ∈  T the 
inequalities in (5) and (7) imply those of (6) and (8), so (ii)/(v) produce NE with 
w w w = ≥ 1 0 (and market shares and profits of (c)) iff (5) and (7) hold.  Again no 
pairings produce other NE with  w w w = ≥ 1 0 , completing (iii).  The proof of (iv) is 
symmetric to that for (iii). 
(b) For  (a,  b)  ∈  T H S / ) ( ∪ , the laissez-faire outcomes in Lemma 3.1(b) and 
3.1(c) always continue as NE since for i=0,1  . ) , ( 1
* w b a wi ≥ ≥φ   It is straightforward 
to check that no pairings (of (i)-(iii) with (iv)-(vi)) produce any other NE.  
   
 
Proof of Lemma 3.3  
Consider first firm 1’s constrained best response. The proofs of (b) and (a)(i) follow 
immediately from the text arguments. 
(a)(ii) and (iv). In figure 3.3(b) and (d),  2 1Y Y  is the curve C3, defined 
by ] ) 1 [( ) , (
2 2
0 0 a b t b a w w − − − = = φ . When b=0 this implies 
2
0 1 / ) ( a t w − = − φ , so 
t
w a
) ( 0 1
− − =





φ , the   41
constrained best response along  2 1Y Y is given by the solution in b to  ) , ( 0 b a w w = , so 
t
w a b
) ( 2 0 1
− + − =
φ . When  ] , 1 [ 1
) ( 0 a a t
w − − ∈
φ , b=0 is the constrained best response. 
(a)(iii). In figure 3.3,  2 1Y Y is again the curve C3, and  2 Y  is now defined by  the 
intersection of C3 and the dashed curve (D), so  ) , ( 0 b a w w = and  
) )( 1 ( 2 b a b a − − − = δ . Writing  t w r / ) ( 2 0 − = φ , these 2 conditions are; (1) 
) 1 )( 1 ( 2 b a b a r − + − − =  and (2)  ) )( 1 ( 2 b a b a − − − = δ  which imply 
) 1 ( ) ( b a b a r − + = − δ , so  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( a r a b r − + = − δ . Substituting back into (1) gives 
[] 0 ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
2
2
1 2 2 2 = − − − − − + δ δ δ r r r a a r a , which simplifies to produce 
a r r a r r






) ( 2 ) ( ) ( δ
δ
δ δ δ . For  [ ] a a , 0 ∈ , the solution of (1) for b 
in terms of a produces the required constrained best response.  
In figure 3.3(c),  3 2Y Y  is the curve C1, defined by (3) ) , (
*
0 b a w w =  





2 b a b a t − + − − − + = φ φ .  3 Y is defined by the additional condition b=0, 
which produces  a a = . The general solution of (3) for b in terms of a then produces 
the required best response for  ] , [ a a a∈ , with b=0 for  ] , [ 1 a a a∈ . 
Turning to the unconstrained best responses, let  ) ( ~
1 a π denote firm 1’s constrained 
best response profits when  [ ]. 1 , 0 ∈ a   0 ) ( ~
1 = a π for  [ ], 1 , 1 a a∈ ; also  ) ( ~
1 a π is a 
continuous function, from Figure 4.1 since  ) , ( ˆ1 b a π is a continuous function. We now 
show that  ) ( ~
1 a π is a strictly decreasing function on [ ); , 0 1 a the symmetry arguments 
used earlier to establish lemmas B.1 and B.2 then complete the proof. 
Along vertical segments of firm 1’s constrained best response graph ((0, 0) to () 0 , 1 a ) 





1 1 3 ) 0 , ( ) ( ~
a a t a a − − − = Π =
δ π and  . 0 / ~
1 < ∂ ∂ a π  Along segments of 1’s   42
constrained best response graph that coincide with the C1  ( ) ) ( 3 . 3 figure in to 3 2 c Y Y  
)) ( , ( ) ( ~ *
1 1 a b a a Π = π  where b(a) is defined by  )) ( , (
*
0 a b a w w = so that 
() 0 , 1 ) 2 )( 1 ( ) ( '
1 − ∈ − + − =
− b a a b  which ensures  0 / ~
1 < ∂ ∂ a π  here also.  Finally, along 
segments of 1’s constrained best response graph that coincide with C3 (Y1 to Y2 in 
Figures 3.3(b), (c) and (d)),  ( ) ) ) ( 1 ( ) ( ~
1 2
1
1 a a b w a − + − = φ π  where b(a) is now defined 
by  )) ( , ( 0 a b a w w =  so  0 ) 1 ( ) ( '
1 < − − =
− b a a b  and again  . 0 / ~
1 < ∂ ∂ a π    
 
Discussion and Proof of Proposition 2 
 
REMARK; The Ziss(1993) proof of Proposition 2 uses Lagrangeans without proof of 
a supporting concavity statement that would ensure sufficiency of the resulting 
conditions. We found the required concavity elusive, and offer instead an alternative 
proof. 
Suppose without loss of generality that  1 ≤ +b a . From (2.6) in the text, social 
welfare is  








0 1 0 0 0 L b a L b a t L L L b a SW − − + − + + − − + = φ φ   





0 0 1 L b t to a L t − − − − − φ φ  if the resulting  [ ], 1 , 0 0 ∈ L  otherwise  . 1 0 = L  
Hence; 













1 if ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 /
,
b a





Substituting the top branch here into the SW formula and writing  b a− − =1 l  
produces the function; 














− − − − + + + + − − + + + = l l l l l δ δ δ δ β α b a t b a t t b a f  
Similar substitution of the bottom branch produces;   43
() () ] 1 [ ,
3 3
3
1 a a t b a g − + − =α  
Hence the maximum social welfare attainable at locations (a,b) ∈ S∪H is; 










1 if ) , (
1 if ) , (
, , ,
b a b a g
b a b a f




Note the following features of f(a,b);  
(i)  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1 1
1 2 2 1
8






1 + − + − + − − + =
∂




















1 1 − + + − − =
∂
∂





(iii) Equating  (i)  and (ii) to 0, f has a unique stationary point  δ δ − = + = 4
1
4
1 ,b a  
with  () . , 48
1 2
2
1 * t t t f b a f − + − = = δ δ α  Now consider problem 1: 
( ) . ) , ( , 1 s.t. ) , ( max
2 2
) , ( H S b a b a b a g
b a ∪ ∈ − − ≥ δ  The solutions are  , 2
1 = a  







1 = < − ∈ a b δ δ   [ ] ; if , 0 4
1
2
1 ≥ ∈ δ b  in both cases the optimal value 
is  . 12
1 * t g − =α  If  , 1 ≥ δ  the feasible set for problem 1 is S ∪ H and the solution to 
problem 1 is then necessarily the social optimum. 
Suppose  1 < δ  from now on. 
Next consider problem 2:  ( ) . ) , ( , 1 s.t. ) , ( max
2 2
) , (
H S b a b a b a f
b a
∪ ∈ − − ≤ δ  The feasible 
set is nonempty (with a non-empty interior) and compact, so there is a solution.  But 
solutions cannot occur, 
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− − = ∂ ∂
−
a
a b f t
δ
 there. 
In addition, when  4
1 ≥ δ the (unique) stationary point is not interior to the feasible set, 
so any solution to problem 2 belongs to the boundary where  ()
2 2 1 b a − − = δ  and 
. 0 , ≥ b a   But f and g coincide on this boundary which was also feasible, but not 
optimal, in problem 1.  It follows that the solution to problem 1 provides the social 
optimum for all  , 4
1 ≥ δ  completing (b).  Finally, when  , 4
1 < δ  the stationary point of f 
is interior to the feasible set of problem 2 with value  ;
* f  moreover 
* * g f >  then.  
Thus the (unique) stationary point is the only solution candidate interior to the 
feasible set for problem 2, and there cannot be a boundary solution.  So the stationary 
point solves problem 2 and, since  ,
* * g f >  provides the social optimum; hence (a). 
            
 
 
 